UN AND THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION

THE FRAMEWORK OF UN AND THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION 

Introduction

The history of Western Sahara can be traced back to the times of Carthaginian explorer Hanno the Navigator in the 5th century BC. Though few historical records are left from that period, Western Sahara's modern history has its roots linked to some nomadic groups (living under Berber tribal rule and in contact with the Roman Empire) such as the Sanhaja group and the introduction of Islam and the Arabic language the end from the 8th century AD. Western Sahara has never been a nation in the modern sense of the word. It was home to Phoenician colonies, but those disappeared with virtually no trace. Islam arrived in the region in the 8th century, but the region, beset with desertification, remained little developed. From the 11th to the 19th centuries, Western Sahara was one of the links between Sub-Sahara and North Africa regions. During the 11th century, the Sanhaja tribal confederation allied with the Lamtuna tribe to found the Almoravid dynasty. The conquests of the Almoravids extended over present-day Morocco, Western Algeria and the Iberian peninsula to the north and Mauritania and Mali to the south reaching the Ghana Empire. By the 16th century, the Arab Saadi dynasty conquered the Songhai Empire based on the Niger River. Some Trans-Saharan trade routes also traversed Western Sahara. In 1884, Spain claimed a protectorate over the coast from Cape Bojador to Cape Blanc, and the area was later extended. In 1958 Spain combined separate districts together to form the province of Spanish Sahara. A 1975 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the status of Western Sahara held that while some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, they were insufficient to establish "any tie of territorial sovereignty" between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. In November of that year, the Green March into Western Sahara began when 300,000 unarmed Moroccans accompanied by the Moroccan Army armed with heavy weapons converged on the southern city of Tarfaya and waited for a signal from King Hassan II of Morocco to cross into Western Sahara. As a result of pressure from France, the US and the UK, Spain abandoned Western Sahara on November 14, 1975, going so far as to even exhume Spanish corpses from cemeteries. Morocco later virtually annexed the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara in 1976, and the rest of the territory in 1979, following Mauritania's withdrawal. On February 27, 1976, the Polisario Front formally proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and set up a government in exile, initiating a guerrilla war between the Polisario and Morocco, which continued until a 1991 cease-fire. As part of the 1991 peace accords, a referendum was to be held among indigenous people, giving them the option between independence or inclusion to Morocco. To date, the referendum has not been held because of questions over who is eligible to vote.[1]

THE FRAMEWORK OF UN AND THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION

In 1988, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front¹ signed the Settlement Proposals under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and a peacekeeping mission was deployed to supervise the ceasefire between both parties and to facilitate the organization of the referendum. However, firstly disagreements in relation to the voters' list and secondly Moroccan unwillingness to go ahead with any revised version of the UN peace plan involving a referendum with an option for independence have led to the current deadlock. Despite the UN settlement proposals have not been implemented, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) effectively monitors the ceasefire and the region remains relatively stable. It can be argued that although the conflict is contained, the political future of the territory remains on hold, and the grievances of Saharawi people are unattended (Shelley 2004; Solí -Martí­n 2006).Western Sahara has an estimated population of 273 000 inhabitants and several thousand refugees living in Tindouf, Algeria.² The territory has lucrative natural resources including phosphates, iron ore, sand and extensive fishing along the Atlantic Coast. Since 2001, after oil/gas reserves were discovered off-shore Mauritania, Morocco granted reconnaissance licenses to Total and Kerr McGee to explore possible oil/gas reserves off-shore Western Sahara (Olsson 2006).This territory has also a geo-strategic value as a crossroads of traditional trading routes between the Sahel and the Maghreb regions and the Western Saharan harbors along the Atlantic coast can play a prominent role in transoceanic exports and imports. When Spanish colonization brought urbanization and incipient industrialization through the development of the Saharan phosphor mines, the Spanish Sahara became one of the African colonies with a highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Diego Aguirre 1988). Hence, the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources for the benefit of the relatively small number of inhabitants would make an independent Saharan State economically viable.[2]

The Western Sahara conflict in the context of the War on Terror

In 2003, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Special Envoy for Western Sahara, James Baker, resigned after seven years of trying to persuade the parties to move along his diplomatic efforts. In August 2003, í Alvaro de Soto replaced William Swing as a Special Representative for Western Sahara. The Peruvian diplomat held a 24-year long career at the UN system. Since 1999, he had been the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus.³ Nevertheless, í Alvaro de Soto was not perceived by the parties as a relevant peacemaker. He certainly lacked Baker’s diplomatic weight to move the peace plan forward. In May 2005, Special Representative de Soto left MINURSO and in July 2005, Dutch Diplomat Peter van Walsum was appointed as a UN Special Envoy. After resigning, Baker expressed his views on the matter of Morocco’s lack of consent with the operation. He clarified his understanding of MINURSO’s role in the context of the US war on terror (1994): This is a really low intensity, low-level dispute. Look, there’s no action-forcing event in the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco has won the war. She’s in possession. Why should she agree to anything? And so she is disinclined to do so. Well, there’s one very good reason why she should, because she will never receive the imprimatur of international legitimacy for her occupation of the territory unless she works out some arrangement that is blessed by the international community, blessed by the Security Council, or acceptable to the other party. That’s why we work so very hard on the idea of an initial autonomy arrangement with self-government and then a referendum at the end to meet the test, the requirement of the Security Council for Self-Determination. Baker’s point of view illustrates the extent to which the US diplomatic position in relation to the Western Sahara question is linked to strategic priorities. Morocco prides itself to be the oldest ally of the US. On 20 December 1777, Morocco was the first country to recognize the independence of the United States of America and in 1786 the Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship was signed between the two countries. The US military alliance with Morocco was forged during the Cold War period. During the 1950s, bomber bases were built at Nouasseur and Sidi Slimane and they were part of the Strategic Air Command’s network of strategic bomber bases pointed at the Soviet Union. Baker sees the history of world order as a dialectic continuum, i.e. the struggle for power between antagonist blocs throughout time. East-West dichotomy has been now bypassed by the war on terror. Morocco’s monarchy played a key role in Africa by supporting the US war against Communism. Now, the US and its security agencies are engaged in supporting Morocco’s regime policies against terrorist groups linked to radical Salafism. The resolution of the Western Sahara conflict can be, once again, put [3]on hold. The Western Sahara case is an illustrative example of the extent to which the politics of democratization promoted by the US administration are constrained by the War on Terror. The policy of ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ has led the US to support regimes in the region which rely on the use of coercion to maintain power. Nonetheless, these regimes are geo-strategic allies and economic partners of the West. Due to the security imperatives dictated by the War on Terror, the US administration has strengthened its military cooperation with the states of the Maghreb region. The US has preferential cooperation ties with Morocco (Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos 2004) and recently, there has been an improvement of relations between Algeria and the US government and other NATO members. Algeria and NATO made their first joint naval maneuvers in the framework of their cooperation on the War on Terror and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the so-called Barcelona process (Martí­n 2002). At the UN level, American policy in relation to the Saharan question seeks equidistance between both major North African economic partners and allies in the War on Terror, Morocco, and Algeria. In this sense, US policy in relation to the Saharan conflict is subordinated to its security and economic interests in the region. The War on Terror led by the US at the global scale has raised geo-strategic stakes in the region. In 2002, fears that the Sahara would become a hiding place for Salafist cells brought the US State Department to promote the so-called Pan-Sahel initiative which was budgeted with more than $120 million (International Crisis Group 2005), aiming at giving training and providing anti-terrorist equipment to countries in the region bordering with the Sahara (Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania). The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) trained and equipped one rapid-reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the four Sahel states. This initiative was renamed and expanded in 2005 to include as new partners Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria. The new Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is conceived as a long-term interagency plan to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa by helping the participating countries ‘to stop the flow of illicit arms, goods, and people through the region’ (United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2005). The US Special Forces train their African counterparts in military tactics, marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation and patrolling. The new TSCTI also attempts to foster information sharing and operational planning between the states of the region. Without a doubt, the US-led War on Terror is shaping security dynamics in North Africa, by enlarging states’ capabilities to clamp down on anti-terrorist groups and political dissenters. Some experts have warned about the extent to which the militarization of the Saharan desert may endanger nomadic tribes’ livelihood and particularly their means of subsistence. Moreover, this initiative strengthens the capabilities of security forces that have an extensive record of human rights violations (Mcelroy 2004; Keenan 2004). In Atar, Mauritania, near the southern border of the Western Sahara territory, the US army has carried out military training exercises with the Mauritanian army in a period of political turmoil in the country. On 3 August 2005, a coup d’état took place; the long-serving dictator Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya was ousted by the military of Mauritania and replaced by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy. Since the pan-Sahel initiative was put in place, the Moroccan press has denounced the presence in Tindouf⁵ of members of radical Islamic organizations in an unsuccessful attempt orchestrated by Moroccan power holders to persuade US to target POLISARIO as an enemy in the War on Terror (Anon 2004; Anon 2007). Meanwhile, in October 2004, the African Union (AU) members met in Argel in a summit on terrorism which set up an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. This new centre will provide an information exchange on terrorist cells operating in AU member states (Africa Union 2004). This was preceded by an agreement between the Algerian government and the US government to establish a formal dialogue on military issues in June 2004. While the influence of Western security policies grows in the Sahara, terrorist activities have not ceased. In Algeria, clashes between the army and unidentified armed groups left several thousand victims throughout the 2000’s decade, with a situation of protracted violence in the provinces nearby Algiers and other northern provinces. Likewise, clashes have continued up to date and the efforts of Bouteflika’s government towards national reconciliation are unable to satisfy Algerian citizenship, largely skeptical on promises such as those expressed by the mighty General Mohamed Lamari. He resigned in June 2004 and it was ascertained that the army was no longer willing to being involved in the country’s political life (Cherfaoui 2004). In Morocco, terrorists hit Casablanca on 16 May 2003 and Moroccan citizens were also involved in Madrid’s train bombings on 11 March 2004. Since 2003, thousands of suspect terrorists have been jailed by Moroccan security forces. Moroccan and International Human Rights organisations have denounced arbitrary arrest, long pre-trial detention, ill-treatment and torture (Cembrero 2004; Amnesty International 2004–2008). In the 2007 Presidential and Legislative elections, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PDJ) has consolidated its 2003 gains, becoming the second political force in the country, and for the first time, the Moroccan monarchy permitted PDJ to have candidates in all circumscriptions. Nonetheless, the turnout in the 2007 election was only 37% and Islamist activists remain very influential political agents. In particular, Sheik d’Abdeslam Yassine’s civic movement Justice and Charity (al-Adl wa al-Ihssan) has succeeded in galvanizing support for a non-capitalist, so-called humanitarian, socio-economic project based on the Islamic Message and the instauration of an Islamic Republic (Yassine 2005).[4][5][6]

The United Nations diplomatic efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict

In  2000, the UN Secretariat decided to give up the efforts towards the completion of the identification process, arguing that the parties were not ready to compromise, and suggested that the parties ‘explore ways and means to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute’ (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1292 2000).⁸ On 20 June 2001, Baker presented the so-called Framework agreement on the status of Western Sahara (Baker Plan I) that contained provisions for a ‘confirmatory’ referendum within the five-year period following the implementation of this agreement. However, the new plan did not specify what alternatives were to be voted on, in case the plan was not approved. Furthermore, those options envisaged in the Settlement Proposals, for independence or integration, were not even contemplated. The Baker Plan I was rejected by the POLISARIO Front who was still advocating the implementation of the UN Settlement Proposals. In 2003, after consultations with the parties, Baker reformulated his proposal by putting forward the so-called Peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara (Baker Plan II). The referendum would take place 5 years after the effective date of the plan that would also include the ballot options previously agreed to in the Settlement Proposals, i.e. independence or integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. The plan provided that all Moroccan nationals living in the area of the Western Sahara territory controlled by Morocco since 1999 – who presently outnumber native Western Saharans – would vote in the referendum. For the first time, POLISARIO approved this alternative to the implementation of the Settlement Proposals. However, the plan was not approved by the UN Security Council because Morocco reacted negatively to POLISARIO’s unexpected eagerness by opposing Baker Plan II. As a result of this deadlock, in June 2004, Baker resigned as the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and there was a long impasse in the UN-mediated negotiations. Out of frustration, the so-called Saharawi Intifada, a popular uprising, was unleashed in Western Sahara controlled by Morocco since May 2005. Protesters demanded political and socio-economic rights for Western Saharan people.

On 11 April 2007, Morocco submitted to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon a new initiative along the lines of the Baker Plan I. Morocco’s new proposal, called ‘Moroccan Initiative For Negotiating An Autonomy Statute For The Sahara Region’, would grant autonomy for the Sahara within the framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity. The Government of the Sahara autonomous Region would exercise similar powers over local administration to those enumerated in the Baker plans I and II. The Region’s autonomy statute would be submitted to the regions’ populations in a free referendum. However, the proposal did not clarify whether this alleged self-determination exercise would enable the Western Saharan people to choose either independence from or integration into Morocco. On the other hand, POLISARIO presented an alternative plan stressing its traditional views regarding the implementation of the self-determination principle through a referendum monitored by the UN. Since June 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands, embarked on four rounds of negotiations with the parties to discuss both initiatives in Manhasset, Long Island (United States). In April 2008, the Security Council met in a closed session to discuss the lack of progress in the negotiations and Peter van Walsum presented a document in which he claimed that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic option. Van Walsum’s pro-Moroccan stance was strongly criticized by the POLISARIO leadership and on 4 August 2008 Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) President Mohamed Abdelaziz sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, in which he stated that Van Walsum had disqualified himself from mediating between the parties. In September Ban Ki-Moon appointed US diplomat Christopher Ross as his new special envoy in Western Sahara. Ross has a long experience in the Arab world and his appointment was welcomed by the POLISARIO leadership who supports a greater US involvement in brokering a lasting solution for the conflict in Western Sahara.[7]

EFFORT OF OBAMA TOWARD THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION

In 2009, the new Special Envoy for the UN Secretary-General, Christopher Ross, was deployed to the region to make some progress towards a peaceful solution to the conflict, but prospects are grim since any diplomatic solution pursued so far would entail the parties making concessions on the core issue of sovereignty. The status quo is a blessing for the occupying power and a curse for the liberation movement. In July 2009, US President Barack Obama wrote a letter to the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, mainly on the Middle East peace process. Obama also requested his cooperation towards a diplomatic solution on the matter of Western Sahara under UN auspices (United States Government 2009): Obama omitted to mention the autonomy proposal laid out by Mohammed VI in 2007. The latter proposal had been praised by the Bush administration in its correspondence with the King of Morocco on the Western Sahara question. After the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1871 on Western Sahara, on 30 April 2009, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice did not refer to Morocco’s autonomy proposal either. Hence, it is apparent that the new US administration is intending to reverse the former US administration policy of endorsing Morocco’s proposal to settle the conflict. It has been actually pointed out unofficially by a Spanish diplomat that Obama’s administration is now working on a new proposal which would draw on the Baker Plan (Cembrero 2009). The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a full member of the African Union whilst Morocco has been long ostracised in the African continent because of its refusal to allow the free will of the people of Western Sahara. Obama has become a flag-bearer of policy change because of his endorsement of principles of democratic accountability and transparency. Perhaps, this is the last opportunity to decolonize the last colony of Africa before Moroccan occupation becomes a fait accompli. However, previous experience from influential US policymakers such as James Baker demonstrates that Morocco is simply not interested in organizing a referendum in Western Sahara. Paradoxically, only a solution that is consistent with UN doctrine and international law can break the current deadlock.

CONCLUSION

This paper argues for a strategy of maximizing efforts to implement a UN plan for the self-determination of the Western Saharan people, advocating international recognition of SADR. Renewed efforts by the international community to achieve this end will only be fruitful if Western countries in cooperation with the AU show political eagerness to move the process forward. There is a wide range of literature on post-Cold War peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention that stresses the extent to which these practices involve exporting Western liberal democratic practices to war-torn societies as a means of conflict resolution (Duffield 2001; Bellamy et al. 2004). However, the Western Sahara case illustrates the extent to which power politics have overshadowed conflict resolution efforts in North Africa. Morocco bases its strategy on blocking any solution that challenges its control over Western Sahara. On the other hand, from the onset of the peace process, POLISARIO has supported all UN-sponsored peace proposals to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. To date, the prospects for broader involvement of the West in the promotion of Western Saharan people’s rights in the current international framework dominated by the US-led War on Terror are rather grim. This is a dangerous situation and conflicts in Israel/Palestine or Cyprus provide strong evidence that protracted military occupations of disputed territories lead to deeply divided and polarised societies. The Western Sahara conflict has been contained but not resolved and this dispute will remain a roadblock for the promotion of economic and political cooperation in the Maghreb region unless courageous diplomatic initiatives such as greater international backing for Western Saharan statehood are put on the peace table.

[8]

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